

22 October 1974

NOTE FOR D/DCI/NIC

George:

We continue to face a need to consider a USIB mechanism - ad hoc perhaps to start - which can look into cross-functional requirements review. I've had [] exploring the options - attached is his initial paper. I have met with the Chairmen of USIB Committees and they are taking steps to "improve" their Committees' handling of requirements. This is particularly true of COMIREX and SIGINT, but Human Sources has also started in response to the DCI's Letter of Instruction.

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I've asked [] to get on your calendar and solicit your help in forming a task team to provide the DCI with a statement of the problem and options. I'd intend to also have []

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Attachment

14 September 1974

NOTE FOR USIB COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

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I want to discuss with you the general subject of requirements at our session on 19 September. Accordingly, I asked [redacted] to prepare the attached paper. The session will also be introductory for General Wilson so I'd appreciate it if you'd be prepared to discuss generally - limit to 3 or 4 minutes - the key issues you feel you face in Committee management.


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USIB-AM-12/74
12 September 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

THROUGH :

SUBJECT : Intelligence Requirements

1. The purpose of this memo is to give you some considerations and possible talking points on the broad subject of "requirements" which may be useful in your 19 September meeting with the USIB Committee chairmen.

2. In my view, the problem of overall intelligence requirements has never been effectively addressed or structured as a system to which the necessary actions controlling the totality of intelligence endeavor can be related. As we now move into a period of severely constrained dollar and manpower resources for intelligence, the need for strict discipline in the requirements process becomes essential. No longer can the intelligence community do everything for everybody who has a demand or desire for responsive intelligence support.

3. The USIB, as a corporate intelligence community body, is responsible, under NSCID No. 1, for identifying and assigning priorities to all intelligence requirements. While this can be viewed as a national requirements responsibility, there is a multitude of departmental and "tactical" requirements which compete to a very large extent for responsiveness by the same intelligence resources which are tasked with national requirements. We cannot afford the luxury of dedicated resources for all different levels of requirements. Alternatively, the majority of intelligence resources are capable of responding to various levels or sources of requirements. The National/Tactical Interface Study is an effort specifically directed to this end.

4. As General Graham observed, "we are still making resource decisions without an audit trail back to the fundamental requirements

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to be served." This observation applies equally in the national, departmental and "tactical" arenas. And the constrained resources simply will not stretch to cover effectively all these requirements. It appears, therefore, that USIB must take a more active role in identifying, stating and prioritizing all intelligence requirements. As a further step, USIB should then determine the essentiality of action against these requirements by the various resources and collection disciplines available.

5. The current USIB committee structure is reasonably well geared to accomplish this latter task, but has no identifiable arrangement for dealing with the overall requirements problem. Thus, the major collection committees -- SIGINT, HUMINT, and PHOTINT (COMIREX) -- struggle continually to apply the full range of resources and activities with which they are concerned. This is a relatively simple task in the photo area (maintenance of target lists against which photosensors can operate), somewhat more complicated in the HUMINT area, and extremely complex in the SIGINT area where the widest range of requirements are tasked on highly technical systems operating in a technically sophisticated and secure environment.

6. Most, if not all, requirements are stated initially without regard for satisfaction capability, feasibility, complexity or cost. There is little or no effective mechanism for priority ordering all requirements or even those tasked within one collection discipline. There is no formal mechanism for determining which collection discipline can operate most effectively against a given requirement or where there may be trade offs among the different discipline capabilities. Director, NSA, has made the point, for example, that reductions in SIGINT resources have now reached a point where there must be a determination of the essentiality of the SIGINT source against a given requirement, rather than simply recognizing the existence of a SIGINT capability to respond as the basis for tasking.

7. In summary, the elements of the requirements problem confronting USIB include:

-- No focal point in our community structure to "staff" requirements for the USIB.

-- No effective prioritizing of all requirements regardless of source or application.

-- No overall requirement evaluation or validation system which would enable us to reject less important or less meaningful requirements.

-- No procedure whereby the essentiality of one "INT" source or another can be clearly associated with a given requirement.

-- There is a "process" for requirements generation and application, but it is not designed as a total system.

8. Several remedies to these problems have evolved from recent rather superficial considerations:

-- Establish a new USIB committee on requirements.

-- Create an ad hoc committee made up of the Chairman of the SIGINT, HUMINT, and COMIREX Committees, possibly under the chairmanship of the D/DCI/NIO.

-- Constitute the NIOs as a requirements committee.

-- Constitute all collection and substantive USIB committee chairmen as a larger ad hoc committee on requirements.

9. None of these propositions has been studied in detail, nor in fact has the overall requirements problem been addressed. There is a compelling need to do so. The IC Staff, with cooperation of certain USIB committee chairmen and perhaps D/DCI/NIO, should take the lead in this effort.

10. Appended hereto are some of the papers which have been developed during recent months as various IC Staff officers considered and commented on the requirements problem.



Attachments: (4)

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
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

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
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25X1 SUBJECT:

 Piece on Requirements ("The Intelligence Requirements Process" previously distributed)

1. I intend to work  paper up into a paper to be coordinated with key USIB agencies.  is getting at a fundamental question that has to be answered in order for USIB and for us to do the intelligence job correctly. We are still making resource decisions without an audit trail back to the fundamental requirements to be served. The KIQ/KEP process is going to help, but as of now it is primarily useful in pointing up the lack of a proper requirements system in the total intelligence process. Even with the KIQ/KEP process operating on a steady basis, we still have USIB failing to address its responsibilities effectively in the requirements area.

2. I have some problems with  approach to the ordering of requirements. To me, a first-order requirement is one that states a fundamental need for intelligence as seen by the user. DCID 1/2 and JSOP Annex A don't quite meet this criterion. They are more on the order of broad guidance and prioritization of effort. The KIQs as presently constituted don't quite fit the criterion either. Some do; some don't. Examples of first-order requirements would be:



Perhaps I am speaking here of a better set of the old PNIOs.



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3. As far as the KIQs are concerned, it may be that they should all, in fact, be second-order requirements rather than first, since first-order requirements tend to be so broad that precision in resource expenditure against them is not feasible. Second-order requirements should be a breakdown of first-order requirements into sub-questions that must be answered in order to meet the first-order requirements. In looking over the list of KIQs presently on the books, a number of them fit in this category.

4. The third order of requirements is as [] has stated, those specific elements of information which allow you to answer the second-order questions.

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5. Naturally enough, Mac is not delving deep into the parallel problems of requirements levied on human and overt sources. This needs to be fleshed out in the paper. I would appreciate the views of [] people on this matter.

6. When we float the paper to the Pentagon we need also to address the separation of peacetime and wartime requirements. A good deal of confusion arising across the board (not just with SIGINT) in the requirements business is the admixture of wartime and contingency requirements with the peacetime requirements. Once we have established a requirements hierarchy and system for the peacetime requirements process, we should ask our Pentagon brethren to establish a parallel set for wartime contingencies involving the major commands as required. Such an approach will help [] efforts in the tactical/national intelligence interface game.

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7. I would like to get together on this problem Wednesday afternoon. (It might be useful for the 10:30 meeting on Thursday with the DCI and the NIOs reference the KIQs.)

(Signed)
DANIEL O. GRAHAM, LTG, USA

Daniel O. Graham
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

*With scheduled
for 10:30 Wed.*

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The Intelligence Requirements ProcessIntroduction

The term "intelligence requirements" is perhaps the most frequently used and also the most frequently misused term in the lexicon of the intelligence community. "Requirements" can cover the spectrum from broad statements of intelligence production needs to the specific information sought in the tasking of an individual collector or technical sensor. In every instance, a stated requirement is used as the basis for creating or operating a collection resource; for processing, analyzing or exploiting the collected data; and for synthesizing, evaluating and reporting single or multiple source information in a product which can range from a spot report to an in-depth study or a national estimate.

The full range of requirements reflect the insatiable appetites of the intelligence consumers, the intelligence managers and the intelligence analysts. Most, if not all, requirements are stated without regard for satisfaction capability, feasibility, complexity or cost. Few, if any, stated requirements are ever fully satisfied; those which may be satisfied usually give rise to further and more detailed statements of need or desire or to regeneration of the requirement for up-dating purposes. Thus, the volume of requirements continues to multiply in proportion to the satisfaction achieved.

Apart from relatively superficial "validation" procedures, no particular effort is made to challenge or reject requirements statements, nor is the originator ever informed of the feasibility, complexity or cost of meeting a stated requirement. In this aspect, the requirements process can be viewed as a huge juggernaut with no brakes and few effective control mechanisms.

Prioritizing or priordering of requirements is another imponderable which detracts from the effectiveness of the process in most instances. The plethora of requirements originators and the wide range of responsibilities they represent adds confusion and conflict to judgments of priority.

Process versus System

So far, I have referred to the requirements "process". It would be preferable to refer to it as the "system". However, a system by definition is "a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole" with the connotation of an organization serving a common purpose and under specific leadership. Except for small segments of the present process which are systematized, the total process does not appear to meet the "system" criteria. To make the process a system should perhaps be one of our basic objectives.

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Elements of the Process

The requirements process can best be understood when viewed in terms of sequential steps which become separable elements in the process. In broad terms these are:

Objectives or Goals -- general statements, usually reflecting end results; relatively few in number and preferably in some order of priority or emphasis; correspond to what are otherwise described as First Order Requirements. Existing example is DCID 1/2 and corresponding JCS JSOP Annex A.

Statements of Requirements or Information Needs -- Expansion of general objectives into more specific descriptions of information needed to support intelligence analysis and product; not directed at any specific collection, processing or analysis discipline; not in priority order except as derived from general objectives; correspond to Second Order Requirements. Existing examples are Key Intelligence Questions, Defense Intelligence Requirements, Essential Elements of Information (EEI) stated in Unified Command war and contingency plans.

Guidance (to collectors, processors, analysts) -- probably the least-defined element of the process; involves directing requirements or information needs to one or more collection disciplines based on judgment of most likely sources to provide data in timely and useable form; also serves as management mechanism for processors and analysts; determination of essentiality of one collection source over others is part of guidance. Existing examples are SORS mission guidance to Directors, NRO and NSA; COMIREX guidance to NRO, Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming (IGCP).

Tasking -- A further detailing of requirements or information need statements into specific tasks to be performed by individual collectors or sensors in consideration of guidance provided; equates to Third Order Requirements in detail of observables, circuits to be covered or targets to be photographed. This element is best carried out by the collection resource manager who can marry the data needs with the technical or access capability of the collector or sensor. Examples are NSA SIGINT system tasking, technical tasking of overhead systems, or specific intelligence tasks levied on HUMINT collectors.

Interrelationships of the Process

In an ideal world, the elements of the process identified above should provide for requirements development to flow in an orderly progression of sequential steps, each detailed statement or action at any level

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being relatable to something at the next higher level. Unfortunately, this does not now occur, and it is difficult if not impossible in many cases to trace tasks, guidance and information needs back to requirements and broad objectives. This is true for two principal reasons:

- many originators of requirements have direct access to collection and processing systems without review by any central authority, and
- there is no central authority or structured mechanism through which requirements can pass for validation, association and the provision of guidance.

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In the imagery collection and exploitation endeavor, the requirement and guidance procedure is much more orderly as the result of a central authority (COMIREX) which receives all requirements, prioritizes them, and provides for collection and processing action in accordance with system capabilities. In a sense, the comparison of the SIGINT system to the imagery system is unfair and unrealistic. Imagery acquisition involves a relatively few systems constrained only by vehicle availability and weather. Success (requirement satisfaction) is a "yes" or "no" proposition. Target denial or

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It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the major problems confronting the intelligence community in requirements management pertain to the SIGINT system.

When is a Requirement not a Requirement?

There is one school of thought in the intelligence community that a stated requirement which exceeds our technical or human capability to satisfy should not be "validated" and levied for collection or processing action. I reject this view. Any requirement for substantive response should be stated and accepted whether or not a capability exists to operate against it. The lack of a current capability could, for example, cause necessary research and development to be undertaken toward creation of a capability. At the same time, we should recognize that some of our most pressing requirements are not likely to ever be satisfied. That fact, however, is not sufficient to deny that the requirement exists.

This brings into play the need for prioritizing and the careful provision of guidance in the application of resources toward requirements satisfaction. The objectives or goals element of the requirements process provides a general priority framework within which second and third order requirements can and should be fit. To do so effectively requires, among other things, that all stated requirements (second order) be reviewed by a central authority who is able to associate and priorder all statements. This having been done, the further provision of guidance incident to conveying the requirements into particular discipline areas can include recommendations on the emphasis of resource application consistent with overall priorities and essentiality of the source. This procedure would recognize that some lower priority requirements would receive no effort in order that appropriate effort is applied to higher priority needs. These determinations should be made by the central authority responsible for providing guidance in each discipline area. Such a procedure is already in effect for the relatively simple imagery discipline and needs to be developed for the SIGINT discipline.

To Make the Process a System

An analysis of the requirements process and its application to the principal disciplines of imagery, SIGINT and HUMINT indicates that the process lacks systematic organizational structure in the first two elements-- objectives or goals and requirements or information needs. The statements in both of these elements need to be associated, the second being derivative from and an expansion on the first. Both sets of statements need to be placed in relative priority order, irrespective of disciplines to be applied. It is suggested that there should be a USIB Requirements Committee established for these purposes.

The application of stated requirements to particular collection and processing disciplines should be accomplished by the respective committees of USIB--COMIREX, SIGINT and HUMINT--in the form of guidance to be

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utilized by appropriate program managers in the allocation of resources and the assignment of operational tasking. Obviously, these procedures will take differing forms depending on the detail and nature of guidance to be provided for tasking purposes.

It seems clear that the SIGINT guidance area is the most complex. Past efforts to systematize this area have been hampered by two major shortcomings:

- a lack of detailed knowledge on the part of the SIGINT Committee concerning resources allocated and capabilities existing within the SIGINT system to respond to requirements and guidance;
- a lack of centralized access to all requirements levied on the SIGINT systems by various originators.

There is evidence that the new SIGINT Requirements Management System (SIRE) being developed by NSA, if shared with the intelligence community and the SIGINT Committee, could go a long way toward alleviating the first problem area. The nature and degree of assistance to be derived from SIRE needs to be negotiated with NSA and developed for community application. There appears to be a willingness to do this.

The "other requirements" problem is a USIB and SIGINT Committee matter involving all members, but particularly the DIA, Military Service and Treasury members. While substantial progress can be made on this problem within the SIGINT Committee, an even more effective system could evolve with the assistance of a USIB Requirements Committee.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- serious consideration be given to forming a USIB Requirements Committee to fulfill the functions discussed above;
- the SIGINT Committee Ad Hoc Review Group give particular attention to a Committee structure or sub-structure which will move toward more effective systematization of requirements for which SIGINT is judged to be an essential source, the prioritizing of these requirements, and the provision of guidance to the SIGINT program manager.

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Addendum

There is an obvious interface necessary between action recommended for the SIGINT Committee and the National SIGINT Plan under development by Director, NSA. Requirements for which SIGINT contributions are essential, resources allocated, system capabilities and an assessment of responsiveness and satisfaction are all ingredients to be considered in the Plan.

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4 June 1974

Thoughts on Rationalizing the
Requirements and Collection Tasking Processes

The President, in his letter of 22 March, stated: "I am particularly concerned that the link between substantive intelligence needs and intelligence resources be clearly understood and evaluated". The most difficult problem facing the DCI in meeting this charge is that there is no such link. The main reason the Intelligence Community could never have had an effective evaluation process (assuming it wanted one) is the tremendously wide gulf between the establishment of requirements and priorities on the one hand and the allocation of resources and evaluation on the other: never the twain meet. This is a pervasive problem. It is reflected in attitudes, thought processes and even organizationally, with one group--USIB--concerned with "substance" and another--IRAC--concerned with resources.

The KEP, of course, was designed mainly to bridge this gulf and, in effect, to provide the link which so rightly concerns the President. But even when operational, the KEP will address only the tip of the iceberg, and there are major problems ahead in making it work at all.

Beneath this overall problem are other closely related obstacles to effective community management. One is the nature of the requirements process. [] has written on that aspect. Another, which threatens the success of the KEP itself, is the absence on the collection side of the community of any capability to review the total collection task, which, bad enough in itself, leads to still another lack: there is no structure allowing for an integrated interface between the production and collection sides of the community.

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Looking at the KEP alone for a moment, this void on the collection side is perhaps the single most serious obstacle to successful implementation. Recognizing the fact that all twelve NIO's cannot effectively provide for the essential interface with collection managers, the IC Staff has provided a KEP monitor to perform this task, among others. This has worked fairly well in the relatively simple job of preparing the Baseline Reports in the pilot run. It is highly unlikely that it will work even for the Performance Reports in the pilot run and almost certain that it will not for a fully operating, steady-state KEP.

The larger problem, of course, is the lack of any meaningful overview of all collection efforts. Combined with the lack of a systematic formulation of requirements, and in the context of the overall separation between "substance" and resources/evaluation, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that as presently structured the Intelligence Community "can't get there from here". Without a soundly-based set of requirements linked to collection tasks, production output and the associated costs, it is difficult to see how the DCI can even know in any coherent way what the community is doing, why it is doing it, and how the resources are being used--much less evaluate overall performance.

Clearly some structural changes are needed. [redacted] has addressed the requirements dimension and recommended an overall Requirements Committee. A good proposal but more is needed. As I see it, there are several approaches one could take:

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(1) Establish a DCI Executive Committee responsible for reviewing and validating community-wide requirements and the resultant collection tasking. The community would report directly to the DCI and be composed as follows:

Committee

D/DCI/IC - Chairman
Senior Representative from DIA - Vice Chairman
D/DCI/NIO
Chairman, SIGINT Committee
Chairman, COMIREX
Chairman, Human Sources Committee
Chairman, Requirements Committee (if formed)

(2) Establish a USIB Requirements and Collection Committee (same responsibilities as in 1 above) composed as follows:

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Attachment 3

D/DCI/IC - Chairman
Senior Representative from DIA - Vice Chairman
D/DCI/NIO
Chairman, SIGINT Committee
Chairman, COMIREX
Chairman, Human Sources Committee
Chairman, Requirements Committee (if formed)

(3) Establish two separate committees, one on Requirements and one on Collection, composed as follows:

Requirements Committee

Chairman designated by
DCI with USIB advice

Members representing
USIB members/Mil Depts

Collection Committee

Chairman designated by
DCI with USIB advice

Members representing
USIB members/Mil Depts

(4) Rely on the NIO's per [redacted] suggestion in his
memo on this subject.

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X1 Attachment: (1) [redacted] Requirements paper
(2) [redacted] paper on "Collection
System Trade-offs"

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DCI/IC 74-083

3 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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SUBJECT : Some Thoughts on How to Manage
Collection System Trade-Offs

1. In theory, and to a considerable extent in practice, the SIGINT, COMIREX, and HUMINT Committees of USIB provide coordinated requirements and collection guidance to NSA, the NRO, and the HUMINT community respectively. What is perceived to be lacking is a community mechanism to coordinate collection between and among these three separate collection systems.

2. The ability of the DCI and program managers to make rational judgments on SIGINT/Imagery/HUMINT trade-offs will depend heavily on a more effective system of evaluation than now exists but which, hopefully, will evolve from KEP. Thus, in my view, whatever mechanism is developed to staff out such judgments should be the same mechanism that makes the key judgments in the KEP process. This points inevitably to the NIOs.

3. What will happen in practice is that each NIO, after an accumulation of experience and knowledge based on the data produced by KEP, will say I need X amount of SIGINT, Y amount of Imagery, and Z amount of HUMINT to meet the needs of my bailiwick. George Carver will add up all the X's, Y's, and Z's and present the totals separately to each appropriate USIB Committee. These will be considered the highest priority, rock bottom requirements for each collection system. The Committee will be responsible for determining what additional requirements will have to be added to meet "other" legitimate needs of customers. This process will require brokering not only with the program managers of three collection systems but also consultation among the three committee chairmen and finally clearance through IRAC and USIB.

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
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Attachment 4

4. It may be argued that the NIOs are not adequately staffed to assume this new function. In my view, it is inextricably bound up with the function they have already been assigned with respect to KEP. And it should take very few, if any, more people to do the former in addition to the latter.

5. The IC Staff, as now constituted, is not equipped to do this job. The essential ingredient, which only the NIOs are possessed of, is the capacity to make substantive judgments on what kinds of collection systems are producing the required types of intelligence to meet our highest priority needs. The IC Staff can, however, provide the resource cost data which will necessarily be required by the NIOs as an input to their substantive judgments.

6. A super-committee, consisting of the chairman of the three cognate committees, would not be in a position to make objective and independent judgments, although this might be a useful staff element under strong NIO guidance and direction as proposed in paragraph 3 above.



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